The Complex Aftermath of Bin Laden Raid

The challenge of foreign policy, like all social systems, is that countries react to what each other does. This article caught my eye tonight, where Pakistan arrested people who helped the U.S. identify and bring down Osama Bin Laden.  The irony is fairly clear:  The U.S. acted unilaterally out of fear that Pakistanis would alert Bin Laden and he would flee, but Pakistan arrests the people who helped the U.S.

In describing the difficulty in working with Pakistan, Senator Dick Luger said

One of the main problems in dealing with Pakistan is that its government is not a monolith, but rather a collection of different power centers that interact in complex ways.  There is the elected civilian government, which over the years has not always been strong or stable; the uniformed military, which has seized power at various junctures; the intelligence service, which has its own independence within the military; and, we are told, a shadowy group of former intelligence agents that can act on its own.  These different actors alternately compete and cooperate with one another, and their influence periodically waxes and wanes.  Equally vexing, each of the players can support U.S. policies one moment, but obstruct them the next.  Add to this mix volatile public elements that can be whipped into an anti-American fervor, and you have a partner who can seem, as some have said, to be both firefighter and arsonist.

That pretty much sums it up.